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Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation:
Enough is Enough*
Maurice Rosenberg * *
Warren R. King***
Recent years have witnessed a torrent of criticism of the
practice of pretrial discovery in federal litigation. The outcry
was significantly amplified by the Pound Conference, convened
in St. Paul, Minnesota, in 1976. Among the conclusions
prompted by the Conference was this one:
There is a very real concern in the legal community that
the discovery process is now being overused. Wild fishing expeditions, since any material which might lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence is discoverable, seem to be the norm. Unnecessary intrusions into the privacy of the individual, high
costs to the litigants, and correspondingly unfair use of the discovery process as a lever toward settlement have come to be
part of some lawyers' trial strategy.'

In response to this concern, the American Bar Association
appointed the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery
Abuse to make recommendations for the control of improper
discovery practices. In late 1977 the Special Committee ad* Points of view or opinions expressed in this Article are those of the authors and
do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of
Justice.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the research assistance provided by Lawrence J.
Cohen, Kathryn E. Peterson, Jeffrey L. Seltzer, and Penfield W. Tate, 111.
** Harold R. Medina Professor of Procedural Jurisprudence, Columbia University;
A.B., 1940, Syracuse University; LL.B., 1947, Columbia University; at' the time this article was written, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice.
*** Associate Judge, Superior Court of the District of Columbia; B.A.E., 1960,
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; J.D., 1967, American University, Washington College of
Law; LL.M., 1969, Yale University Law School; at the time this article was written, Attorney Advisor, U.S. Department of Justice, Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice.
1. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice
System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 288 (1978).
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vanced a group of proposals for consideration by the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of the
United States. The Advisory Committee adopted some of the
proposals and circulated a draft report for public comment.' After hearings and considerable debate, the Advisory Committee
issued a revised report in February 1979' that dropped several of
the bar committee's proposals, including restrictions on the permitted scope of discovery and limitations on the number of interrogatories a party could serve without a court order.
In April 1980 the Supreme Court promulgated amendments
to the federal discovery rules4 which did not include either the
restrictions on the scope of discovery or the limitations on the
number of interrogatories. Mr. Justice Powell, joined by two
other Justices, dissented from the promulgation of the amended
rules, criticizing as "inadequate" the package that had been
promulgated and expressing concern that significant reform
would be delayed for ten years by the "tinkering" changes.' His
dissent warned that without substantial improvement "the discovery Rules will continue to deny justice to those least able to
bear the burdens of delay, escalating legal fees, and rising court
COS~S."~

The 1980 amendments have not quieted the unrest in the
bar about federal discovery practice. The ABA's Special Committee has returned to the fray by advancing several additional
proposals and urging them upon the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules. In addition, discovery-related research has been
conducted by the Federal Judicial Center: the Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice (OIAJ) of the Department of Justice,' and the National commission for the Re2: Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 77 F.R.D. 613 (1978).
3. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Revised Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 80 F.R.D. 323 (1979).
4. 446 U.S. 997 (1980).
5. Id. at 998, 1000 (Powell, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 1000-01.
7 . See P. CONNOLLY,
E. HOLLEMAN
& M. KUHLMAN,
JUDICIAL
CONTROLS
AND THE
CIVILLITIGATION
PROCESS:
DISCOVERY
(Federal Judicial Center 1978).
8. See C. Ellington, A Study of Sanctions for Discovery Abuse (May 11, 1979) (report submitted to the Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice, United
States Department of Justice).
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view of Antitrust Laws and Procedures.@In late 1978 Judge
Mary M. Schroeder and John P. Frank, with support from
OIAJ, organized a conference of about twenty discovery specialists at the Arizona State University Law School. The meeting
resulted in an influential report arguing against the Special
Committee's proposed limitations on the scope of discovery and
the number of interrogatories.1° A follow-up conference, under
OIAJ auspices, was held at the Department of Justice in August
1980 with a similar group of conferees. At the two meetings
there was a rough but clear consensus that the time had arrived
for a significant reevaluation of the entire process of pretrial discovery. There was a widespread sense of uneasiness about the
system as it presently functions.
Underlying the disquiet about federal discovery practice are
growing doubts about two basic premises of the pretrial discovery system adopted for the federal courts in 1938. One challenged premise is that in the discovery practice "more is better.''
This theme was written into the rules in 1938 and in 1947 received a vigorous endorsement from the Supreme Court in its
celebrated decision in Hickman u. Taylor:ll
Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by
both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either
party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has
in his possession.12

The second premise that has come under increasing attack
is that discovery does not need judicial attention because lawyers will practice it under a rule of reason reinforced by mutual
self-interest in avoiding the waste of their time or their clients'
money which results when unnecessary pursuit or resistance in
the discovery process occurs. This view holds that discovery
practice should be a self-regulating affair with judges remaining
aloof and uninvolved except in those rare situations that lawyers
find themselves unable to resolve on their own.
Even though the widespread cries of "discovery abuse" are
not explicitly phrased as challenges to the "more is better" and
9. NATIONAL
COMMISSION
FOR THE REVIEW
OF ANTITRUST
LAWSAND PROCEDURES,
REPRESIDENT
AND THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL
(1979).
10. REPORT
OF ARIZONA
STATEUNIVERSITY
DISCOVERY
CONFERENCE
ON THEADVISORY
OF THE RULESOF CIVILPROCEDURE
(DISCOVERY)
(Nov.
COMMITTEE'S
PROPOSED
REVISION
CONF.];See 1978 ARIZ.ST. L.J. 494.
1978) [hereinafter cited as REPORTARIZ.DISCOVERY
11. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
12. Id. at 507.

PORT TO THE
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"judges not needed" premises of federal discovery practice, that
is what they seem to be. The implication of the federal rules and
court decisions, that the more discovery the better, is fortified
by the provision in Rule 26(a) that "the frequency of use of
these methods is not limited" unless the court finds reason to
restrict it by issuing a protective order under Rule 26(c) "for
good cause shown." The causes warranting issuance of protective
orders do not include the repetitiveness, redundancy, or nonnecessity of discovery of the type or from the source in question.
Nor do they include any indication that the court should confine
discovery to an amount proportionate to the issues or values at
stake in the litigation. A reaction against the wide-open repetitive kind of excesses in discovery practice may be one reason for
the hue and cry about "abuse."
The other premise of the rule-that discovery could be regulated by the lawyers themselves-was formulated without taking into account the steady change in the last generation in the
method employed by lawyers to fix their fees. This change has
been characterized by a movement toward the practice of billing
by the hour or fraction." In a period of rising afauence and rampant litigiousness, lawyers have experienced a pleasing convergence of two strong motivations: their professional urge to leave
no stone unturned in preparing the case through pretrial discovery, and their economic interest in increasing the number of billable hours they devote to the case. A "discovery industry" has
arisen-a vocation that appears to be self-justifying if not selfregulating. That is, in cases that can tolerate it, discovery is an
end in itself, without much reference to whether the incremental
value of discovered materials is a t least equal to the cost in energy and fees of getting them."
This Article reviews the discovery rule changes proposed by
the ABA's Special Committee and others, evaluates the proposals in light of available research and the opposition that has
been raised to them, and examines alternatives that we believe
are more responsive to the fundamental problems of discovery.
In short, we confront directly the theories that "more is better"
13. See, e.g., Darby, It's About Time: A Survey of Lawyers' Timekeeping Practices,
4 LEGAL
ECON.39 (1978);Laumann & Heinz, The Organization of Lawyers' Work: Size,
RESEARCH
J.
Intensity, and Co-Practice of the Fields of Law, 1979 AM. B. FOUNDATION
217.
14. See Kaminsky, Proposed Federal Discovery Rules for Complex Civil Litigation,
48 FORDHAM
L. REV.907 (1980).
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and that "judges are not needed" because discovery should be
regulated by the lawyers themselves.

A. The 1977 Proposals: Limiting the Scope of Discovery and
the Number of Interrogatories
In 1977 the Special Committee issued a report that recommended amendments to a number of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including several of the rules governing pretrial discovery." Appropriate committees of the Judicial Conference
considered the report, solicited comment, conducted public
hearings, and eventually recommended a set of amendments
which, on April 29, 1980, were promulgated by the Supreme
Court and, encountering no opposition from Congress, became
effective August 1, 1980.16 Measured against the amendments
that actually went into effect, the Special Committee's discovery
proposals acheived mixed success.
Two of the most significant and controversial proposals
made by the Special Committee, but not adopted by the Judicial
Conference, were (1)a revision of the scope of discovery permitted by Rule 26(b) (the phrase "relevant to the subject matter" of
the action would become "relevant to the issues raised by the
claims or defenses of any party") and (2) a revision limiting to
thirty the number of interrogatories that could be served without court approval. Both proposals met with strong opposition
from the bench and bar.
The objections to the scope-narrowing proposal were summarized by Judge Mary M. Schroeder and John P. Frank," who
argued that it would likely wipe out notice pleading," would be
ineffective in the face of the rule permitting liberal amendments
to pleadings,lS and would prompt a new round of litigation as to
the meaning of the terms employed in the proposed amendment.'O On the basis of a review of reported cases and a number
15. AMERICAN
BARASSOCIATION,
REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE
FOR THE STUDY
DISCOVERY
ABUSE(1977).
16. 446 U.S. 997 (1980).
17. Schroeder & Frank, The Proposed Changes in the Discovery Rules, 1978 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 475.
18. Id. at 486. See also Becker, Modern Discouery: Promoting Efficient Use and
Preventing Abuse of Discovery in the Roscoe Pound Tradition, 78 F.R.D. 267 (1978).
19. Schroeder & Frank, supra note 17, at 481-90.
20. Id. at 480-81.
OF
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of interviews with attorneys, they concluded that the scope-narrowing proposals would reduce discovery in very few, if any,
The Special Committee had generally conceded drawbacks
in its proposal but insisted the changes were necessary to send a
message to the courts not to err "on the side of expansive disc ~ v e r y . "Schroeder
~~
and Frank did not question the need for
sending a message; they simply concluded that the proposal
would deliver the wrong message to the wrong place.2s
Schroeder and Frank also summarized objections to the proposal to limit the numbers of interrogatories a party may serve
without court approval, making the point that fixed and arbitrary limits are often inappropriate because cases vary widely in
their needs." Fifty interrogatories may be excessive in some
cases and wholly insufficient in others. Further, they feared that
courts may be called upon to squander time and energy considering applications to enlarge the number of interrogatories that
can be served and determining whether a particular question
constitutes a single interrogatory or more than one?
Opposition to this proposal has also been based on the argument that excessive interrogatories are only part of the problem:
for example, unnecessarily lengthy and numerous depositions
can be as objectionable as interrogatories and are often more expensive to the par tie^.'^ In addition it has been argued that any
limitation on the number of interrogatories that can be served
without court supervision may unfairly discriminate against litigants with modest means who often rely upon interrogatories as
their principal or sole means of obtaining dis~overy?~

B. The 1980 Proposals: Assuring Stricter Compliance
In early 1980 the Special Committee issued a second set of
proposals to amend the discovery rules." Included were the major ones earlier rejected by the Advisory Committee-the scope21. Id. at 479-80.
22. AMERICAN
BARASSOCIATION,
supra note 15, at 3.
23. Schroeder & Frank, supra note 17, at 480.
24. Id. at 487.
25. Id.
26. Minutes of Conference on Improving Pretrial Discovery 2 (August 28, 1980).
27. Id.
28. AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION,
SECOND
REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE
FOR THE
STUDY
OF DISCOVERY
ABUSE(Jan. 1980) [hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT
NO. 21.

CURBING DISCOVERY ABUSE

5791

585

narrowing proposal and the limitation on the number of interrogatories that may be served without court approval. In addition, the Special Committee proposed a new subsection designed
to induce stricter compliance with specific limitations and generally to curb disproportionate pushing, tripping or overdoing in
discovery practi~e.'~
The approach in the new subsection was patterned after
Rule 11, which provides that an attorney's signature on a pleading constitutes a certificate that the pleading is well founded and
bona fide. Specifically, the Special Committee's proposal is that
in submitting a discovery request, objection, motion or opposition, the attorney's signature should constitute
a certificate by him that he has read the request, objection,
motion or opposition; that to the best of his knowledge and
belief the request, objection, motion or opposition is made in
good faith and is not unreasonably annoying, embarrassing or
oppressive or unduly burdensome or unduly expensive [given
the nature and complexity of the case, the amount in controversy or other values a t stake in the litigation, and the discovery, if any, which has already been had;] and is not interposed
for delay.s0

The italicized words track the language in present Rule 26(c),
prescribing the grounds for issuance of a protective order, but
add the modifier "unreasonably." The bracketed material is new
and enlarges existing obligation^.^^ Many courts would not,
under current practice, issue protective orders in the circumstances covered by the new Ianguage." In introducing the concept of proportionality and calling attention to discovery already
had, the proposal undercuts the "more is better" theme and the
"frequency . . is not limited"ss directive.

.

29. Id. at 11.
30. Id. (emphasis and brackets added).
31. The language following the bracketed material is borrowed from present Rule
11.

32. That is not universally so, however. A few courts have held that discovery that is
disproportionate, cumulative, duplicative, available from another source, or obtainable
by some other discovery device can be limited by the issuance of a protective order. See
Walker v. United Parcel Sews., 87 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (plaintiff denied opportunity to depose a witness on grounds that deposition would be largely duplicative); I n re
United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 74 F.R.D. 497, 498 (S.D. Cal. 1975) ("interrogatories must be tailored to discover only what is reasonable and necessary to the litigation
a t hand"); Frost v. Williams, 46 F.R.D. 484 (D. Md. 1969) (two hundred interrogatories
found to be oppressive in case involving ordinary rear-end collision).
33. FED. R. CIV.P. 26(a).
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A. The Special Committee's View of the Problem
We submit that the Special Committee's effort to curb
"overdiscovery" by narrowing the breadth of discovery misperceives the problem in its most usual form. It is probably true
that some discovery may seem excessive to a responding party or
to a court because it appears to reach beyond the issues, subject
matter, or claims and defenses fairly raised or presented in the
case as made by the pleadings?' But it is also true that very
often when discovery is viewed as excessive by responding parties and courts it is so regarded not because it is irrelevant to
issues in the case but because, even though relevant, it is duplicative, redundant, or simply disproportionately costly in relation
to the values at stake in the l i t i g a t i ~ n .In
~ ~short, much of the
truly abusive discovery that occurs is discovery that is too deep
rather than too broad.
If that point is sound, discovery improvement efforts should
be directed not toward narrowing the definition of what is relevant, but rather toward protecting responding parties from redundant, duplicative and "disproportionate" discovery by reducing the number of inquiries that may be made concerning
matters otherwise properly subject to discovery.
Such a reduction might be accomplished through more frequent use of protective orders under Rule 26(c)? As presently
cast, Rule 26(c) permits a judge to "make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.""
Surveys of reported casess8 and available empirical evidencess
34. On the other hand, Schroeder and Frank maintain that such instances are extremely rare. Supra note 17, at 479-80.
35. Note 26 supra.
36. This suggestion was originally made in a working paper prepared for the November, 1978, Arizona State Conference. REPORT
ARIZ.DISCOVERY
CONF.,supra note 10, at
3 n.1.
37. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
38. Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Dykes v. Morris, 85 F.R.D. 373 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Petruska v. Johns-Manville, 83 F.R.D. 32 (E.D. Pa.
1979); United States v. I.B.M. Corp., 453 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Kiblen v. Retail
Credit Co., 76 F.R.D. 402 (E.D. Wash. 1977); Alexander v. Parsons, 75 F.R.D. 536 (W.D.
Mich. 1977); Wright v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Anderson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Wirtz v. Capitol Air
Serv., Inc., 42 F.R.D. 641 (D. Kan. 1967); Taylor v. Atchison, T. & S. Fe Ry., 33 F.R.D.
283 (W.D. Mo. 1962); Stonybrook Tenants Ass'n v. Alpert, 29 F.R.D. 165 (D. Conn.
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disclose that trial courts are reluctant to restrict discovery on
these grounds unless the moving party makes a strong showing
of an enumerated kind of injury. Under prevailing law, if the
objection to discovery is that it is disproportionate to the needs
of the case, cumulative, duplicative or more readily available
from another source, and no showing of extreme burden or hardship is made, courts are unlikely to issue protective orders. This
is in line with the traditional "more is better" attitude that rests
upon the Hickman canon that "[m]utual knowledge of all relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation."'O

,B. Determining Whether Discovery is Excessive
The acceptance of the traditional "more is better" attitude
raises a number of questions with respect to what ought to be
permitted in the discovery process:
1. Should a party who has essentially completed discovery
in a particular area be permitted to subject an adversary to additional discovery requests related to the same general subject?"
2. Should a party be required to respond to an adversary's
lengthy interrogatories shortly before the party is to be deposed
by the adversary? Could not the same question be asked during
the deposition, eliminating redundancy for both parties?*%In
some circumstances should discovery by interrogatories be required as more efficacious than depositions?
3. Should a party be required to respond to a discovery re1961); B. & S. Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 24 F.R.D. 1 (S.D. Tex.
1959); Hornung v. Eastern Auto. Forwarding Co., 11 F.R.D. 300 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
39. The Federal Judicial Center has found:
[Tlhere is support for the view that judges generally accord great deference to
the liberality of the discovery rules. Though rulings on protecting motions tend
to favor the moving party, the tendency is not nearly so strong as that in rulings on compelling motions directed to substance. Judges . . . overwhelmingly
permit requesting parties to compel discovery, but are far less likely to permit
requesting parties to block discovery.
P. CONNOLLY,
supra note 7, at 107 (footnote omitted).
40. 329 U.S.at 507.
41. In Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 661 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), the court would not permit additional discovery. The court emphasized that it had a special duty to restrict
discovery of this character because the case was of a complex nature. It is not clear how
the court would have ruled if the case had not been a complex one or if the stakes involved had been substantially less.
42. See Fishman v. A.H. Riise Gift Shop, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 704 (D.V.I. 1975); Boyden
v. Troken, 60 F.R.D. 625 (N.D. Ill. 1973).

588

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I981

quest when it can be established that the requester has already
received the information in another manner or from a different
source, or that the information is more readily available from
another source?4s
4. Could discovery be limited without unduly prejudicing
the rights of parties when the material sought to be discovered
can be readily obtained by another, less burdensome method?"
5. Should a party be required to respond to interrogatories
when that party has been previously deposed on the same area
covered in the interrogat~ry?'~
Although none of these questions can be answered easily
and categorically in the abstract, the reduction of unnecessary
duplication and repetition is certainly a worthwhile
It
might seem that under the current rule courts are authorized to
issue protective orders to achieve that goal in the circumstances
described in the five questions posed above. In practice this generally does not happen. Usually courts have been reluctant to
issue protective orders except in the most compelling
circumstance^.^"

IV. A PROPOSAL
TO LIMITTHE DEPTH
OF DISCOVERY
To effect the change in practice needed to reduce unnecessary duplication and repetition in discovery, Rule 26(c) should
be amended to specify that protection is to be afforded not only
against discovery that causes "unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense," but also
against discovery that is duplicative and cumulative or out of
proportion to the needs of the particular case. By broadening
the grounds for the issuance of such orders, and by emphasizing
the need for reducing duplication and repetition, Rule 26(c)
might encourage trial judges to be more diligent in preventing
needless discovery.
43. See Lenard v. Greenville Mun. Separate School Dist., 75 F.R.D. 448 (N.D. Miss.
1977); Apco Oil Corp. v. Certified Transp., Inc., 46 F.R.D. 428 (W.D. Mo. 1969); United
States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 25 F.R.D. 252 (D.N.J. 1960).
44. For example, a party to whom interrogatories are addressed may be willing to
stipulate or admit the relevant underlying facts. Compare Quaker Chair Corp. v. Litton
Business Sys., Inc., 71 F.R.D. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) with Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F.
Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii 1975).
45. This issue can arise when counsel, due to oversight, negligence, or incompetence,
has failed to make the appropriate inquiries during a deposition and then seeks to cover
the omissions by interrogatories.
46. See note 38 supra.
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The likely result of the adoption of this proposal would be
greater judicial involvement in the discovery process-an infringement of a general premise of the federal rules as originally
drawn and of the specific intention of the 1970 amendments that
discovery should operate outside the court and be self-regulating. That hope simply has not been realized due to a variety of
factors: the desire of lawyers (and parties) for delay; lawyer billing practices which create incentives to enlarge rather than minimize time spent; the widespread notion that discovery is an end
in itself rather than a means of facilitating judgment:? the normal effects of human inertia abetted by absence of deadlines or
authoritative prodding; and the conflict' between the adversarial
system on one hand and a process that depends upon cooperation for its success on the other.48As a result, the current trend
of thinking is that greater judicial involvement, not less, is essential to reduce problems of discovery abuse. Professor Wayne
D. Brazil, in a recent report on the discovery practice of the Chicago Bar, concluded: "The generalization that emerges from the
numerous vocal complaints about judicial attitudes is that to a
great many attorneys judges appear to believe that discovery
disputes simply do not belong in the courtrooms. Many lawyers
deeply resent this attit~de.'"~
This view paralleled the finding of
the Federal Judicial Center in its 1978 report on discovery practices that effective control of discovery depends upon judicial
management.60
47. In a recent article, Martin Kiminsky noted:
The discovery process has become, for both sides, a litigation weapon t o discourage and prevent prosecution of claims, to force a settlement or merely to
wear down an adversary. Counsel, regrettably, often look upon discovery as a
meal ticket or annuity rather than as a quick and inexpensive quest for evidence. These were obviously not the intentions of the draftsmen of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and should not be permitted to thwart the right of
litigants to their day in court.
Kaminsky, supra note 14, at 922 (1980) (footnotes omitted). See also Pollack, Discovery-Its Abuse and Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219 (1978). In his concurring opinion in Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 (1979), Justice Powell wrote that "discovery techniques
and tactics have become a highly developed litigation art-one not infrequently exploited to the disadvantage of justice.':<
48. See Brazil, Views From the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers
RESEARCH
J. 219.
About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUNDAT~ON
49. Id. a t 246.
50. P. CONNOLLY,
supra note 7, a t 77.
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A. Amending Rule 26(c) to Consider Proportionality

If greater court involvement is necessarily the wave of the
future, one method of accomplishing it is to strengthen the hand
of the trial judges to control discovery by broadening their
power to issue protective orders. Such a proposal was recommended by the Arizona State conferhce" but was never acted
upon by the Judicial Conference. A redraft of Rule 26(c) incorporating the principle is provided in Appendix I.
This amendment would authorize trial judges to exercise
control by ensuring that the discovery sought is not out of proportion to the needs of the case. Taking into account factors of
redundancy and proportionality, a court could limit the number
of depositions or interrogatories, or impose whatever other limits
it concluded were necessary, to confine discovery efforts to those
reasonably calculated to yield benefits that are worth the costs.
This approach, geared to the circumstances of the case, is more
promising than one that sets arbitrary numerical limits or that
assumes that fluid concepts such as "relevant to the issues raised
by the claims or defenses" can provide clear boundaries or send
intelligible messages to the bench and bar.

B. Amending Rule 26(a) to Encourage Discovery Limitations
If Rule 26(c) is amended as proposed, the courts will clearly
possess the power to curb excessive discovery and will be encouraged to do so. The message will be: Discovery is useful, but
it must not be used to the point of abuse. To avoid diluting the
message by flashing a contradictory signal, Rule 26(a) should be
amended to drop the statement that "the frequency of use of
[discovery] methods is not limited."
The first of two possible amendments to subsection (a)
would directly parallel the provisions of proposed Rule 26(c) by
providing that discovery be limited to that which is "commensurate in cost and duration with the needs of the case, the resources reasonably expected to be available to the parties or persons involved and the substantiality of the issues."52 This
51. REPORTARIZ. DISCOVERY
CONF.,
supra note 10, at 9; Schroeder & Frank, supra
note 17, at 498.
52. See Appendix I. This provision would allow the court to take into account the
need of parties with limited resources to opt for less expensive discovery methods. Such
a party might, for example, be permitted to file more interrogatories than ordinarily necessary because of insufficient resources to develop the case by more expensive discovery
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approach would make it unmistakably clear that too much discovery, even on relevant subjects, is not acceptable. This formulation would convey a realization that there are times when discovery must be limited even if the effect may be to preclude
uncovering evidence or leads to evidence that might conceivably
aid the presentation of the case. Not every incremental bit of
information is worth the trouble and expense of obtaining it.
The discovering side will insist it is, but, in a proper case, the
other side is entitled to a determination that it is not worth the
trouble.
The second possible amendment would be a simple provision in Rule 26(a) allowing the court to limit the frequency of
discovery pursuant to the provisions of Rule 26(c)."
Adoption of these proposals would harmonize the sections
of Rule 26 that set explicit limits on discovery (subsections (a)
and (b)) with the provisions that empower the courts to issue
protective orders to ensure that discovery is properly confined
(subsection (c)). These amendments would also aid the trial
court in the exercise of its recently enacted authority to set
"limitations on discovery" under the discovery conference provisions of new Rule 26(f).

C. Eliminating the Need for Additional Attorney
Certification
If the proposed amendments to Rule 26(a) and (c) are
adopted, the Special Committee's attorney certification proposal
may be unnecessary. Disproportionate, cumulative, and duplicative discovery will be curbed or controllable pursuant to Rules
26(a) and (c). The sanctions provided in Rules 26 and 37 should
be adequate to deal with any discovery activities that go beyond
those barriers.
A case can be made for including a certification requirement
in the rules to serve as an early warning that the purpose of the
discovery process is to gain information-not to cause delay, increase expense, wear down opponents, force settlement, or discourage meritorious claims or defenses-and that discovery
devices such as depositions. In addition, this provision would allow the court to curtail
discovery in circumstances where it is appparent that a party with significant resources
is using the discovery process to wear down a financially weaker adversary, either to
discourage meritorious claims or defenses or to force unwanted settlements. See Kaminsky, supra note 14, at 922.
53. See Appendix 11.
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must not be pushed to excess. If this case persuades the
rulemakers, a certification provision, using essentially the same
language as that contained in the proposed amendment to Rule
26(c), could be adopted to serve that purpose.
In its latest proposal the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
has chosen a different method to combat disproportionate and
repetitive discovery-viz., by inserting in Rule 26(b) a new paragraph that spells out excess-avoiding limits on otherwise permissible d i s ~ o v e r yWe
. ~ strongly endorse that approach, which was
one of the options we recommended to the Advisory Committee
in an earlier draft of this paper.

There has been widespread criticism in recent years of the
undue expense and burden of the civil discovery process. It is
argued that discovery has gotten out of hand because two fundamental and long-standing premises of the civil litigation process
have not been subjected to sufticiently critical scrutiny in light
of present circumstances. One premise, which was elevated to
high principle in Hickman v. Taylor,ss holds that a party is entitled to know everything there is to know about the opposition's
case. The second premise is that court involvement in the discovery process should be exceptional; the norm was to be lawyer-regulation, with self-interest assuring good behavior. In an
earlier day when cases were fewer, litigation less complex, and
attorney motivations perhaps different, these premises may have
been sound. We submit that they are no longer reliable premises
and that this new reality must be faced squarely in amending
the rules.
The proposals advanced here attempt to do this. They
would restrain discovery not solely on the basis of relevancy,
privilege, or whether the discovery sought would be annoying,
embarrassing, oppressive, unduly burdensome, or unduly expensive, but also on the basis of whether the discovery requested
avoids excesses of redundancy and disproportionality. Guides to
these concepts would be provided in the rules and would be applied in light of the circumstances of the case. Necessarily, our
54. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 90 F.R.D. 451, 479 (1981).
55. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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proposals contemplate a greater involvement of judges in the
discovery process in an effort to assure that permitted discovery
will not be carried to excess.
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Proposed Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)
(c) Protective Orders and Other Limits on Discovery. The
court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters
relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be taken may sua sponte; upon motion by a party or
by the person from whom discovery is sought, and upon good
cause shown; or in conjunction with any conference conducted
pursuant to these rules make an order which justice requires if
the court finds it necessary to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense or if the court finds that the discovery sought is cumulative or duplicative; obtainable from some other source which is
either more convenient, less burdensome or less expensive; or,
that the party seeking discovery has previously had ample opportunity to obtain the information sought. I n entering a protective order pursuant to this subsection, the court shall ensure
that the discovery allowed is commensurate in cost and duration with the needs of the case, the resources reasonably expected to be available to the parties or persons involved, and
the substantiality of the issues. A protective order issued pursuant to this subsection should include one or more of the following: (1)that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery
may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a
designation of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be
had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by
the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a
deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the
court; (7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be
disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties
simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed
in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in
part, the court may, on such terms and conditions as are just,
order that any party or person provide or permit discovery. The
provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.

CURBING DISCOVERY ABUSE

Proposed amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)
(a) Discovery Methods. Parties may obtain discovery by
one or more of the following methods: depositions upon oral
examination or written questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon
land or other property, for inspection and other purposes;
physical and mental examinations; and requests for admission.
[Unless the court orders otherwise under subdivision (c) of this
rule, the frequency of use of these methods is not limited].

The bracketed material would be deleted and the following
provision substituted:
The frequency of use of these methods may be limited by
the court, incident to any conference conducted in accordance
with these rules, on motion for a protective order pursuant to
Rule 26(c), or on its own initiative to ensure that the discovery
sought is commensurate in cost, duration, and frequency with
the needs of the case, the resources reasonably expected to be
available to the parties or persons involved and the substantiality of the issues.

As an alternative, the bracketed material should be deleted
and the following substituted: "The frequency of use of these
methods may be limited by the court pursuant to subsection (c)
of this rule."

